POLITICAL MARKETING AND MANAGEMENT IN THE 2020 GENERAL ELECTION: KEY FINDINGS AND ADVICE FOR FUTURE PRACTICE

Dr Edward Elder and Associate Professor Jennifer Lees-Margherment

December 2021
POLITICAL MARKETING AND MANAGEMENT IN THE 2020 NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION

Key Findings and Advice for Future Practice

By Dr Edward Elder and Associate Professor Jennifer Lees-Marshal

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This report identifies key findings and advice regarding future practice for political parties in New Zealand from research presented in the book Political Marketing and Management in the 2020 New Zealand General Election edited by Edward Elder and Jennifer Lees-Marshalment. It covers issues and policy areas important to voters and how leaders and policies aligned with voters, supporters/prospective voters and key target markets.
THE 2020 NEW ZEALAND GENERAL ELECTION

The 2020 New Zealand General Election both challenges and confirms political marketing and management orthodoxy. On one hand, there were multiple distinct challenges: it was held during a global pandemic; crisis management not only dominated communication, but the Prime Minister branded the election itself as the “COVID election”; and the election date itself was delayed four weeks due to a second lockdown in New Zealand’s largest city. However, the effectiveness of political marketing and management over the three-year term was also important. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s effective management of the Labour/New Zealand First/Greens government added competence and credibility to her long-established brand of empathy and compassion. This all helped Labour win the first outright majority since proportional representation was introduced as New Zealand’s electoral system in 1996. The National Party failed to reconnect with voters during their first term back in opposition, and went through two leadership changes in less than two months. While New Zealand First lost all nine of their seats, the Green Party added two despite the constraints of government. The ACT Party successfully re-branded to rise from one to ten MPs, and the Māori Party returned to Parliament on the back of a constituency-targeted appeal.

KEY FINDINGS AND ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS

On policy
• The most important issues for voters during the 2020 election campaign were the economy (e.g. economic recovery, job creation, taxes), COVID-19, healthcare, the environment, labour (e.g. employment, personal income) and housing.
• There is still a desire for a more interventionist government that provides greater support for those less well off – a continuing trend from the 2014 and 2017 Vote Compass data.
• Newly discovered through the 2020 Vote Compass data, there is also a public desire for a more protectionist government that makes New Zealand less reliant on other countries for its’ goods and services, taxes companies exporting water, and deports convicted foreigners.
• The 2020 Vote Compass data also showed that there is room for leadership on issues such as oil and gas exploration and Māori rights, where public opinion was divided or more neutral, thus providing an opening for persuasion.

On the parties
• The Labour Party needs to beware the shifting sands of support. Delivery will be key to maintaining at least most of their large and ideologically diverse electoral coalition, so the implementation unit is a good start. However, progress has to be communicated in a clear and succinct manner, and include empathy towards business community. The Government should also establish their own version of ‘Team Labour’ in order to present the party is more than just the Prime Minister.
• The National Party need to heed our advice from 2017 and focus on reconnecting with voters in order to start the process of creating a distinctive new product. The party needs to be
reflective and respectful of voter’s demands and put energy into proposing entrepreneurial policies that align with the New Zealand electorate of the 2020s, not 2008, while also being aligned with National’s traditional centre-right principles. This should also involve a concerted effort to re-establish National’s brand of economic competence and stability, both in presentation and practice.

- The Green Party should continue to focus on navigating a distinct path forward by pushing for faster and more robust government action in key areas, while targeting the more left-leaning block of Labour’s large electoral coalition through policies and messaging that emphasises a compassionate post-COVID-19 economic vision and environmentally sustainable.

- ACT New Zealand should maintain a robust market intelligence operation in order to maintain an understanding of, and unite, the party’s demographically and ideologically diverse coalition around the freedom-brand. In doing so, the party should build their brand around the whole team, not just leader David Seymour.

- Te Pāti Māori should build on their niche supporter base through adjustments to social policy in order to cater to younger more socially liberal voters, while maintaining and highlighting the party’s strong views on issues under the umbrella of Māori rights in order to mobilise the party’s base.

- New Zealand First should focus both on rebuilding their relationship with traditional supporters as well as a newer generation of more socially conservative, economically nationalistic and potentially less well-educated working-class voters that no party currently in Parliament is catering to. This could be done by adopting unique and populist policies in areas such as the environment and housing.
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ABOUT THE RESEARCH


Co-edited by political marketing experts Edward Elder and Jennifer Lees-Marshment from the University of Auckland, with contributions from academics and practitioners, this book covers topics including political strategy, market research, political branding, delivery marketing, targeting and political communication. It explores the use of political marketing and management during the COVID-19 pandemic and provides valuable insights into political marketing and management in practice, not just for New Zealand, but for political leaders, parties, and campaigners around the world.

Sources used in the research include:
- Vote Compass survey data, with 182,399 unique respondents during the 2020 campaign.
- 24,000+ respondents from Vote Compass Post-Election Survey.
- Practitioner perspectives from market researchers David Farrar and David Talbot, political advisors Mike Munro, Tom James, Neale Jones and Robin Campbell, ACT New Zealand Leader David Seymour, and TOP then-Deputy now-Leader Shai Navot.
- Analysis of videos, photographs, social media, speeches, policies, press releases, election billboards, leaders’ debates, politician’s interviews by the media, and polls.

About the Authors

**Dr Edward Elder** is a teaching fellow and researcher at the University of Auckland whose research focuses on political marketing and strategic communication in New Zealand and the United States. His work can be found in books such as: *Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand; Marketing Leadership in Government;* and *Political Marketing in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election*. He was an analyst for Vote Compass in the 2017 and 2020 elections.

**Associate Professor Jennifer Lees-Marshment** is an Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations and an Associate of Koi Tu: The Centre for Informed Futures at the University of Auckland. Author/editor of 17 books, Jennifer is a world expert in political marketing with additional research interests in political management, public input, and political leadership. Jennifer was lead academic advisor to TVNZ’s Vote Compass in the 2014, 2017 and 2020 New Zealand General Elections. See [www.lees-marshment.org](http://www.lees-marshment.org) for further details. Any correspondence or comment regarding this report should be sent to j.lees-marshment@auckland.ac.nz.

Acknowledgements

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**Disclaimer:** Koi Tū: The Centre for Informed Futures is an independent, non-partisan think tank and research centre at the University of Auckland. Any views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and may not necessarily reflect the views of Koi Tū.
**VOTER VIEWS ON ISSUES AND POLICIES**

Despite Ardern declaring 2020 to be the “COVID election”, research revealed that New Zealander’s concerns were more complex than that.

**Most important issues**

In a crisis, voters views are more subject to change. The online public engagement survey Vote Compass found that healthcare fell from being the top issue for voters in 2017 to third in 2020, while the environment rose from sixth to forth. The economy was the most important issue, followed by COVID-19. Housing, which had been third in 2017, fell to sixth. The most important issues to voters during the 2020 General Election can be seen in the figure that follows:

Vote Compass respondent’s views on the top issues during the campaigns: 2017-2020

![Graph showing changes in top issues from 2017 to 2020](image)

*Sources: Vote Compass New Zealand 2017 & 2020*

*n = 251,364 + 145,017*
Most supported policies
Policies which Vote Compass respondents indicated greatest support for were on taxing water exporting, deporting foreign criminals and euthanasia (see expanded version in Appendix 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Issue Topic</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government should impose a royalty on companies that export New Zealand water.</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>88.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand should deport foreigners who are convicted of a criminal offence.</td>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>81.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patients with terminal illnesses should be allowed to end their own lives with medical assistance.</td>
<td>Conscience Issues</td>
<td>74.90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Vote Compass New Zealand 2020  n = 182,399*

Support for a more interventionist government
A clear majority of voters wanted more interventionist government that does more to support those less well-off and protect the environment, paid for by the most well off. This is consistent with data from 2014 and 2017.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>% Agree/More</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government should cover the cost of dental care for adults with low incomes.</td>
<td>69.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much should wealthier people pay in taxes?</td>
<td>60.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much should New Zealand do to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions?</td>
<td>59.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How high should the minimum wage be?</td>
<td>51.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should provide free lunches to students in state schools.</td>
<td>50.93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Vote Compass New Zealand 2020  n = 182,399*

Desire for a more protectionist government
Newly discovered from the 2020 Vote Compass data, there was a noticeably strong trend of support for a more protectionist government approach. A clear majority of voters wanted action against foreign or overseas organisations and individuals and to reduce reliance on other countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government should impose a royalty on companies that export New Zealand water.</td>
<td>88.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand should deport foreigners who are convicted of a criminal offence.</td>
<td>81.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should prevent foreign ownership of residential properties.</td>
<td>71.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand should be less reliant on other countries for its goods and services.</td>
<td>67.52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Vote Compass New Zealand 2020  n = 182,399*

Room for leadership on certain issues
There is room for leadership to move public opinion on issues such as oil and gas exploration and Māori rights. Opinion on these issues was more divided, with relatively evenly split response rates, suggesting the public is open to persuasion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Less</th>
<th>The Same</th>
<th>More</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How much should the government limit oil and gas exploration in New Zealand?</td>
<td>36.45%</td>
<td>25.92%</td>
<td>33.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much of a role should the Treaty of Waitangi have in New Zealand law?</td>
<td>35.60%</td>
<td>35.64%</td>
<td>26.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much should the government do to make amends for injustices committed against Māori?</td>
<td>35.32%</td>
<td>32.46%</td>
<td>29.69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Vote Compass New Zealand 2020  n = 182,399*
THE LABOUR PARTY

“COVID-19... represented a tectonic shift in the political landscape... Research at this point was used not just to measure the relative fortunes of the parties, but also to provide a detailed insight into the public understanding of the virus, response, and likely behaviours.”

UMR/Labour Pollster David Talbot, in Chapter 9 of Political Marketing and Management in the 2020 New Zealand General Election

Key Findings from the 2020 New Zealand General Election
When the Labour Party entered government in 2017 Jacinda Ardern promised it would “be a government of transformation”. Ardern maintained her image of responsiveness and compassion, while effective crisis management helped Labour attracting significant support in the 2020 election, where they won a landslide victory. However, Labour struggled to deliver on core promises, especially in the area of housing, and their political marketing and management had several limitations.

Policy responsiveness to the general public
Labour’s positions on the 30 main Vote Compass propositions were not as well aligned with respondents as might be expected, given the party’s landslide election win. Their positions on average correlated 3.79 percent less with respondent views than they did in 2017.

In 2020, Labour was more tactically responsive. They aligned well with the respondents on Vote Compass propositions which gained high respondent support, such as the government preventing foreign ownership of residential properties, the government covering the cost of dental care for adults with low incomes, as well as having wealthier people pay more in taxes – all of which had more than 60 percent respondent support and were in contrast to National’s positions. Labour were also as well aligned with respondents’ views as possible on propositions in two of the three most important issue categories, COVID-19 and healthcare.

Labour responded to voter’s increasing concerns about the economy by labelling the 2020 May Budget as being about ‘jobs jobs jobs’. During the campaign, they adopted classic positioning for parties seeking a second term and adopted a slogan that asked for more time, ‘Let’s Keep Moving’.

The Vote Compass post-election survey indicates that 78 percent of respondents believed that the Labour Party offered policies that were responsive to what New Zealanders wanted (see Appendix 6).

Policy responsiveness to their own supporters
Labour’s policy positions were on average in line with the views of just under half of Vote Compass respondents who indicated their intention to vote for Labour. Labour aligned well with these respondents on propositions in the categories of COVID-19, healthcare and the environment.

However, average alignment with these respondents was 6.19 percent lower than in 2017. This is somewhat understandable, given the larger pool of respondents who would have indicated their intention to vote for Labour in 2020 compared to 2017. But Labour’s also held positions on
a number of economic propositions that corelated with few of these respondent’s views. For example, Labour’s position that New Zealand should not rely less on other countries for its goods and services (10.06 percent) and that the corporate tax rate should remain about the same (17.62 percent) were far from the most common view held by their supporters, where over 70 percent wanted more action taken. This may cause problems for the party at the next election if they are unable to satisfy the expanded pool of supporters who voted for them in 2020.

Key target markets
The overall platform of Labour was most in line with the views of people on the Māori electoral roll, gender diverse people, and students. Their policy positions correlated on average better with younger age groups compared to older, with people who hold higher academic qualifications compared to lower, as well as with lower income earners compared to higher.

Surprisingly, Labour’s policy position correlation with undecided voters was not as high as we might expect. Labour’s policy positions were on average in line with the views of just over 40 percent of undecided voters, down 5.58 percent from 2017. This included holding the most common position among undecided voters on 18 of 30 propositions. More importantly, Labour aligned as well as possible with undecided voters around three of the top four most important issues during the election - COVID-19, healthcare, and the environment.

Labour also engaged in cognisant targeting of undecided previous National voters in the last week of the campaign through a advert feature Finance Minister Grant Robertson as well as Ardern’s closing statement at the final TVNZ Leaders’ Debate:

“If you’re someone who values stability and consistency in these uncertain times, and maybe you’ve backed John Key or Bill English before, this is a message for you... We’ll do what it takes to keep people safe, protect jobs and businesses, and the economy... Don’t take a risk right now when it matters most”. (Labour Party 2020c)

Some of you may have never voted for Labour before and my message is for you. Every vote for Labour is delivering strong and stable government and that’s what we need right now... And that’s why I’m asking that we stick together, that we keep moving and that you party vote Labour”. (Labour Party 2020d)

Leader likability
Of the ten party leaders asked about in Vote Compass 2020, at 6.73 out of 10, Jacinda Ardern was considered by respondents to be the most likeable. Ardern was on average considered more likable than any other leader among all 30 demographic grouping examined. Moreover, unusual for a sitting Prime Minister – Ardern’s perceived likability increased 10.16 percent from her 2017 rating. Atypically for a Labour leader, Ardern was also perceived as highly likable by older voters. Ardern was also viewed as more likable by Greens and Te Pāti Māori supporters on average than their respective parties’ co-leaders.

Moreover, 82 percent of Vote Compass respondents thought that Ardern was in touch with ordinary people’s concerns (see Appendix 4) and most voters thought she offered a positive and clear vision for New Zealand (see Appendix 5).
Delivery
At the start of the 2017-20 governing term, Labour engaged in effective delivery and delivery communication with its’ 100 days delivery plan checklist, which included passing fees free study for first-year tertiary students, the Healthy Homes Guarantee Bill, increasing the minimum wage and passing the Families Package.
However, delivery failure on flagship policies, such as on KiwiBuild’s initial targets, quickly became apparent. As Ardern’s Chief of Staff conceded, “a lot of the policies that Labour went to the last election with and published in a manifesto [were] enacted in a much more diminished form... because they’ve had to give way to New Zealand First and the Greens in order to get it through the parliament” (Munro 2019). Labour acknowledged problems in delivery after declaring 2019 the “Year of Delivery”, but the COVID-19 crisis took over.

Despite this, the Vote Compass post-election survey showed that Labour improved perceptions of their ability to govern during their first term in government, from 63% agreeing that they seemed to be a united team capable of governing in 2017 to 77% in 2020, including 50% strongly agreeing (see Appendix 8). 62 percent agreed that Labour’s policy promises were believable in 2020 (see Appendix 7). Post-election, Labour also created an operationally focused unit to drive delivery called the Implementation Unit and created priorities from the 2020 5-point plan.

Nevertheless, as their plan for beyond 2020 did not indicate clear priorities or pledges they could deliver quickly once re-elected, voters have in essence bought an undefined product. This makes getting credit for any delivery and maintaining voters support harder.

Recommendations for Labour’s Future Practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beware the shifting sands of support</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Understand the large market share won in 2020 partly reflects poor political marketing by the Opposition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Defend the market share by delivering key initiatives for the different demographic groupings, especially more populous ones, to convert them into long-term supporters.</td>
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<td>3. Reframe delivery within the post-COVID environment where needed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Communicate delivery of priorities and progress over time towards broader transformation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Develop ‘Team Labour’ to ensure the party becomes more than the party of Ardern by highlighting more ministers delivering and maintaining unity within the large caucus.</td>
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THE NATIONAL PARTY

“National had gone into the 2020 campaign with Strong Team, More Jobs and Better Economy... National had a hard time successfully promoting their three key offerings. It might not have worked even if the party had been more unified in presentation and message, as the election was very much focused on COVID-19 and the Prime Minister. But, at a minimum, the public need to know what a party stands for. That was not the case for National in 2020.”

Curia/National Pollster David Farrar, in Chapter 9 of Political Marketing and Management in the 2020 New Zealand General Election.

Key Findings from the 2020 New Zealand General Election

The National Party went from getting the most party votes in 2017 to one of their lowest results ever in 2020, ignoring our 2017 advice to accept they were out of touch and engage in significant reflection. In the process, the party’s reputation for economic competence and stability was dismantled.

Policy responsiveness to the general public

At the start of the 2017-20 governing term, there were signs of responsiveness. Under new leader Simon Bridges, National launched a consultation process in 2018. But by the time of the election, National’s policy positions on average were in line with less than a third of Vote Compass respondents’ views, the second lowest of the six parties examined and only 0.19 percent higher than in 2017.

This included their positions on the economy, the most important issue for National’s supporters and an area where National have traditionally been viewed as stronger than Labour. National were more often better aligned with respondents on average in areas considered less important to Vote Compass respondents, such as law and order.

The Vote Compass post-election survey data also showed that 61 percent of respondents thought National offered policies that were unresponsive to what New Zealander’s wanted (see Appendix 6).

Policy responsiveness to their supporters

National’s policy positions were on average in line with the views of less than 40 percent of Vote Compass respondents who indicated their intent to vote for National. There were only 13 of 30 propositions where a majority of these respondents agreed with the party’s position, such as their supporters agreeing with them that cannabis should not be legalised (63.68 percent) and that the government should incur less debt to address COVID-19 (50.62 percent).

But National were also tactically unresponsive. The party was only more aligned with their supporters around issue areas their supporters did not consider important, such as the environment (ranked 8th out of 16) and law and order (ranked 14th out of 16).

Although the economy was clearly the most important issue for National supporters, less than 10 percent agreed with the party that wealthier people and corporations should pay less in taxes, while only 17.59 percent agreed that New Zealand should not be less reliant on other countries for its goods and services.

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Overall, National’s supporters were more economically moderate, or even progressive, than where the party stood in 2020, at least on the issue area they clearly considered most important, the economy.

Key target markets
National’s policy positions were most in line with the views of demographics where the left-wing parties were weakest: higher earners (people making more than $100K annually), older respondents (people aged over 65) and male voters.

With undecided voters – a key segment for a major opposition party – National performed poorly. Their policy positions were on average in line with the views of just over 30 percent of undecided voters, and even worse in issue areas those voters considered important. For example, although the economy was the most important issue for undecided voters, National did not correlate with the most common position among these voters on any of the economy related propositions. Notably, less than 5 percent agreed with the party that wealthier people and corporations should pay less tax.

Leader likability
The two changes in leadership in an election year was obviously damaging and, at 3.79 out of 10, Judith Collins’ perceived likeability among Vote Compass respondents was low for a major party leader - 26.71 percent lower than what her predecessor Bill English received in 2017. Collins also had a lower likability rating among her party’s supporters than most other leaders, and was 11.66 percent lower than what English received in 2017. Furthermore, 68 percent of respondents, and even 39 percent of National supporters, thought Collins was not in touch (see Appendix 4).

Collins received her highest average likability ratings from respondents making $100K+, respondents aged 65+, and male respondents, with respondents of Māori descent, respondents on the Māori electoral roll, and gender diverse respondents at the low-end.

Delivery
The public’s perception of National as a united team capable of governing declined considerably between 2017 and 2020, with 80 percent of Vote Compass respondents saying that National did not seem to be a united team capable of governing (see Appendix 8). Worse, only 24 percent of National’s own supporters thought they were capable of governing, with 55 percent disagreeing. Furthermore, only 38% of respondents thought their policy promises were believable (see Appendix 7).

This is a very bad result for a party that once had governing ability as a core part of its brand. Instead of improving their brand post-2017, they dismantled it.
Recommendations for National’s Future Practice

Be reflective, respectful, and entrepreneurial

1. Accept the election loss and stop making excuses for it.
2. Listen to and rebuild the party’s relationship with voters, especially younger New Zealanders.
3. Avoid focusing on attacking the Government’s handling of the pandemic. Instead, emphasise what National would offer in government that is different and better.
4. Focus on building a new product with policies that are more responsive to key target markets, as well as help New Zealand adapt, innovate and thrive post-pandemic, to increase market share.
5. Decontaminate the existing brand and develop an entrepreneurial and fresh brand position for the leader and the wider party.
THE GREEN PARTY

“The Greens undertook many rounds of quantitative and qualitative research to better understand people who were considering voting Green… Green support rose 26 percent... giving the party two more Members of Parliament (MPs)... by campaigning as a productive and progressive partner to the Labour Party... [with] a “further and faster” partnership message.”

The Green Party’s Research and Policy Director Robin Campbell, in Chapter 9 of Political Marketing and Management in the 2020 New Zealand General Election.

Key Findings from the 2020 New Zealand General Election
After supporting Labour through a confidence and supply agreement during the 2017-20 governing term, the Greens were at risk of losing support, as minor governing partners previously had. However, the Greens actually gained seats in 2020, while remaining well aligned with the market.

Policy responsiveness to the general public
The Green Party had higher correlations with the Vote Compass respondent on average than both Labour and National. The Greens put forward visionary, strategic policy thinking with a policy vision document called Think Ahead, Act Now. Vote Compass data suggested public support for government action in key policy areas, in line with the Greens’ policy positions - with 60 percent believing the Government should do more to reduce greenhouse gas emissions - including 27 percent believing much more - 69 percent believing the Government should invest more in the development of railways, and 60 percent agreeing that wealthier people should pay somewhat or much more tax.

Policy responsiveness to their supporters
The Green Party was the most successful of the six parties examined at holding positions in line with Vote Compass respondents who indicated their intention to vote Green in 2020. The party was on average in line with the views of almost two thirds of these respondents.

They also aligned well with their own supporters around the issue area these respondents considered most important, the environment. For example, 92.45 percent of their supporters agreed that New Zealand should do more to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, while 67.84 percent agreed that the Government should do more to limit oil and gas exploration in New Zealand.

Where the Greens did not hold the most common position held by their supporters, the party normally held a comparatively liberal view, such as on whether the Government should incur more debt to address the COVID-19 crisis, where their supporters wanted to incur the same amount, while the party wanted to incur more.

Key target markets
The overall platform of the Greens was most in line with the views of gender diverse people, people on the Māori electoral roll, and those with graduate degrees. Their policy positions correlated on average better with younger people, with people who hold high academic qualifications, as well as with lower income earners.
The Greens’ policy positions were not as well aligned with undecided voters in 2020 as they were in 2017 – 46 percent in 2020, down 5.17 percent from 2017. On the economy, the most important issue area to these respondents, just over 58 percent agreed with the Greens positions that the wealthy and corporations should pay more in taxes, while 67.41 percent agreed that New Zealand should be less reliant on other countries for its goods and services.

However, the Greens support for incurring more debt to deal with COVID-19 was only supported by 15.39 percent of undecided voters. The Greens were also on average least in line with undecided voters around diversity & inclusion. For example, only between 27 and 29 percent of undecided voters agreed with the Greens that the people should be allowed to change the sex listed on their birth certificate, without having to undergo a medical treatment to change their gender, as well as that statues of historical figures deemed as racist should be removed from public spaces, while between 47 and 52 percent disagreed.

Leader likability
The Green Party co-leader’s perceived likeability was reasonable overall, with more support from students and gender diverse respondents. Davidson in particular was perceived as more likable by those on the Māori electorate roll, while Shaw was perceived as more likable by respondents with bachelors and graduate degrees. Both did less well amongst older respondents, especially those between 50 and 64.

Delivery
In Parliament, the Greens were able to demonstrate competence through Shaw’s delivery of the Zero Carbon Act. Nevertheless, power comes at a cost, and constraints of working with New Zealand First meant the party failed to get stronger environmental policies through.

Recommendations for the Greens’ Future Practice

1. **Navigate a distinctive path**
   - Navigate a path that is distinctive from Labour by pushing for faster and more robust government action in key areas to maintain responsiveness to the party’s own environmentally-focused supporters.
2. **Appeal to the more left-leaning block of Labour’s current large electoral coalition through policies and messaging that emphasises an environmentally sustainable and compassionate post-COVID-19 economic vision.**
3. **Targeting younger New Zealanders and emphasise youth-relatable MP Chlöe Swarbrick’s effective relationship marketing with them.**
4. **Utilise ministerial positions to deliver on issues important to core supporters and utilise existing and upcoming social media platforms to communicate delivery.**
ACT NEW ZEALAND

“We re-positioned the party as ACT for Freedom... End of Life Choice displayed our basic value system - people own their own property and the most important property is your own body - and then use it for something that was compassionate - the alleviation of some of the most gruesome excruciating suffering that humans face. It also showed ACT could achieve difficult things.”

ACT Party leader David Seymour, in Chapter 9 of Political Marketing and Management in the 2020 New Zealand General Election.

Key Findings from the 2020 New Zealand General Election
ACT’s use of political marketing and management between 2017 and 2020 illustrates how the actions party’s take in the years before an election are vital to electoral success, resulting in the party increasing from 1 to 10 MPs.

Policy responsiveness to the general public
Despite the 2020 result being ACT’s best ever, the party’s positions on the 30 propositions correlated with the views of respondents on average less than the other five parties examined, and 0.63 percent lower than in 2017. Their alignment with respondents on tax in particular, which had been the cornerstone of ACT’s brand since its inception, was particularly low.

What they did succeed at, however, was their overall rebranding, which was created after significant listening and market research, to focus more on personal freedom. In doing so, the party attracted voters beyond their traditional segment of older, rich, white men.

Policy responsiveness to their supporters
ACT’s policy positions were not well aligned with the views of Vote Compass respondents who indicated their intention to vote for ACT. Just over one third of these respondents on average aligned with the party’s position on the 30 propositions. 0.24 percent lower than in 2017, despite a majority of supporters holding a uniform view on 19 of the 30 propositions.

ACT policy positions around the issue area their supporters considered most important, the economy, was also poor. Of note, less than 15 percent of their supporters agreed with the party’s position that wealthier people and corporations should pay less in taxes – with at least 47 percent believing both should pay more.

Key target markets
ACT’s policy positions were most in line with the views of people making $100K+, male voters, and people aged over 65, while they were least well aligned with the views of undecided voters and, at just under 26 percent, the lowest of all six parties examined in this regard.

ACT did better on specific issues related to the party’s rebrand as the party of freedom. For example, 74.58 percent of undecided voters agreed with ACT’s position that patients with terminal illnesses should be allowed to end their own lives with medical assistance, a key issue during their campaign, while a plurality agreed with ACT’s position that the government should not guarantee a minimum income for all New Zealanders. However only between 24 to 30
percent agreed with ACT’s positions on COVID-19 related propositions, the lowest of the six parties examined.

Leader likability
Seymour appeared on the show *Dancing with the Stars* in 2018, which improved his reputation. Seymour attracted the second highest likability rating among Vote Compass respondents, which is striking given minor party leaders’ ratings are normally noticeably lower than both major party leaders’ ratings. It was also 1.45 times higher than the average for the other five minor party leaders examined, and an 88.87 percent increase on Seymour’s 2017 rating. Of note, Seymour was considered more likable than Collins among all 30 demographic groupings examined. Like Collins though, Seymour received his highest respondents making $100K+, respondents aged 65+, and male respondents, with respondents of Māori descent, respondents on the Māori electoral roll, and gender diverse respondents at the low-end.

Delivery
Opposition parties are not normally expected to deliver. However, ACT were able to convey delivery by getting a private members bill, the End of Life Choice Act, through Parliament and then a successful binding referendum with 65.91 percent voter support, fitting the party’s new freedom brand.

**Recommendations for ACT’s Future Practice**

*Understand and unite a volatile coalition around the freedom-brand*
1. Understand that ACT was not well aligned with voters generally or their supporters specifically on policy in 2020. Thus, future policy positions need to be more responsive, while maintaining the public perception of the party’s freedom-focused brand.
2. Appreciate that the party’s increase in support is volatile. Thus, conduct new market research to understand the expectations of new supporters: what unites them, what is important to them, and where their views differ.
3. Maintain the unique and popular positioning of the leader.
4. Communicate a sense of the new ACT team, connecting their unique characteristics to distinctive issues and different demographics – e.g. develop youth-relatable Deputy Party Leader Brooke van Velden’s communication to suit younger potential voters.
5. Emphasise what ACT would do/prioritise as part of a National-led government.
TE PĀTI MĀORI

Key Findings from the 2020 New Zealand General Election

Te Pāti Māori took a highly niche, targeted approach in 2020 and succeeded in getting themselves back into Parliament with two MPs by aligning themselves with their traditional voter’s demands.

Policy responsiveness to the general public

Te Pāti Māori had a higher correlation with Vote Compass respondents on average than both Labour and National, despite targeted a much smaller slice of the electorate than both major parties. Of particular note, Te Pāti Māori correlated as well as possible with Vote Compass respondents on propositions related to the economy and housing. Regarding the economy, this meant Te Pāti Māori’s policy positions were almost twice as well aligned with Vote Compass respondent overall as Labour’s were, and more than eight times more aligned than National. Of note, 67.52 percent of Vote Compass respondents agreed with Te Pāti Māori that New Zealand should be less reliant on other countries for its goods and services, while under 13 percent held Labour and National’s position to disagree with this proposition.

Policy responsiveness to their supporters

The views of Vote Compass respondents who indicated their intention to vote for Te Pāti Māori differed from respondents overall, especially on around the issue area these respondents considered most important, Māori rights. Te Pāti Māori’s positions were in line with just over three fifths of their supporters overall, and were in line with the most common view of their supporters on all but six out of 30 propositions. On propositions relating to Māori rights, more than 87 percent of Te Pāti Māori’s supporters agreed with the party that the Treaty of Waitangi should have more of a role in New Zealand law and that the Government should do more to make amends for injustices committed against Māori. In other words, Te Pāti Māori’s policy positions were in line with their supporters on the issue most important to these voters.

However, the party often held a comparatively conservative view on the few issues where they deviated from their supporters. For example, while the party believed patients with terminal illnesses should not be allowed to end their own lives with medical assistance and that cannabis should not be legalised, between 64-70 percent of their supporters believed they should be.

Key target markets

Te Pāti Māori’s policy platform was most in line with the views of people on the Māori electoral roll, gender diverse people, and people with a graduate degree. Their policy positions correlated on average better with younger age groups, with people who hold higher levels of academic qualification, as well as those on a lower income.

Te Pāti Māori’s policy positions also aligned 4 percent lower with undecided voters than in 2017, at just under 45 percent. The picture was complex – on the two most explicit healthcare questions - around dental care for adults with low incomes and rehabilitation services to address drug abuse - Te Pāti Māori correlated well with undecided voters. But when it came to conscience issues relating to healthcare, they did not. Notably, only 16.65 percent of undecided voters agreed with the party’s position that patients with terminal illnesses should not be allowed to end their own lives with medical assistance.
Leader likability

Te Pāti Māori’s co-leaders during the 2020 election were not perceived to be as likeable by Vote Compass respondents overall as the leaders of the other five parties. However, both Debbie Ngarewa-Packer and then co-leader John Tamihere were seen as more likable among respondents from the Māori electoral roll, respondents of Māori descent, students and, not surprisingly, those who indicated their intention to vote for Te Pāti Māori. Overall, Ngarewa-Packer tended to be perceived as more likable than Tamihere among these key demographics, while Tamihere tended to be perceived a little better among demographics outside of Te Pāti Māori’s traditional target demographics, such as ideologically right-leaning voters and higher income earners.

Recommendations for The Te Pāti Māori’s Future Practice

**Build and grow the party’s niche**

1. Draw on parliamentary resources to represent the party’s niche market and communicate action in the areas these voters care most about.
2. Broaden the party’s appeal among its niche market by promoting the product more widely, while catering to a younger cohort with more socially liberal views within it.
3. Utilise the visibility two sitting MPs brings to put the issues supporters care about on the public agenda.
4. Make an overt effort to hold hui to maintain an understanding of what party’s supporters want, considering this may have changed, or may change, given the pandemic.
5. Review positions on conscience issues to see if the party’s supporters are more socially liberal than the party’s current positioning and adjust accordingly.
6. Create a campaign strategy that looks to both increase the party’s number of Māori electorate seats while placing more attention on increasing the party’s percentage of the party vote.
NEW ZEALAND FIRST

Key Findings from the 2020 New Zealand General Election

New Zealand First began the 2017-20 governing term in a strong position: determining which major party would be in government, choosing to form coalition with Labour. However, as we warned in 2017, the party needed to identify a new market position to create clear space and market share from other parties, or risked again losing their market share while in government. Unfortunately, they did not heed this advice, and struggled to define and communicate a coherent and popular product for 2020.

Policy responsiveness to the general public

The problem for New Zealand First in 2020 was not policy. Of the six parties examined, New Zealand First’s policy positions most closely aligned with views of Vote Compass respondents overall, 3.17 percent higher on average than in 2017 when the party won nine seats. Of particular note, New Zealand First aligned well with the public on propositions relating to the environment and housing, and were the most aligned with the public of the six parties examined on propositions relating to labour (e.g. employment and income), albeit at just 42.55 percent.

Policy responsiveness to their supporters

However, New Zealand First had issues aligning with the views of Vote Compass respondents who indicated their intention to vote for New Zealand First. On one hand, New Zealand First’s policy positions were on average in line with the views of over 45 percent of these respondents. In saying that, the party was still less aligned with the views of these voters than respondents overall. This is particularly surprising, given New Zealand First’s perilous position meant that those considered New Zealand First voters were down to the party’s most ardent, and thus comparatively more ideologically homogeneous, supporters.

New Zealand First’s policy positions did align well with the views of their own supporters where the party held more populist positions, such as strong support for the government deporting foreigners convicted of a criminal offence (89.52 percent), preventing foreign ownership of residential properties (82.59 percent) and New Zealand being less reliant on other countries for its goods and services (77.96 percent). However, the party’s positions were less in line with the views of their own supporters on taxing the wealthy and corporations, where less than 30 percent agreed with the party that they should be taxed the same, while more than 66 percent believed they should be taxed more.

Key target markets

New Zealand First’s policy positions correlated best with voters aged 65+, followed by those with diplomas or a certificate level educational achievement only, as well as non-students. Noticeable, however, was that New Zealand First aligned better with younger respondents than older ones on propositions relating to housing and particularly the environment, similar to what was seen with Vote Compass respondents overall. The party’s policy positions on average also correlated the best of the six parties examined with undecided voters. On only one proposition did New Zealand First correlate with less than 20 percent of undecided voters.

Leader likability
Winston Peters was perceived as less likable by Vote Compass respondents than five of the other seven leaders examined, only ahead of Te Pāti Māori’s co-leaders. Among the 30 demographic groupings examined, Peters was viewed as most likeable among respondents from the Māori electoral roll and respondents of Māori decent. Furthermore, Peters’ perceived likability was higher among respondents aged 18-29 than those aged 65+, going against established orthodoxy. Peters’ perceived likeability amongst New Zealand First’s own supporters was reasonable, at 6.99 out of 10. However, this was lower than the 7.74 rating Peters received from these respondents in 2017. This is particularly alarming, given the smaller and thus more ardent pool of supporters represented in the 2020 data.

Delivery
Despite leader Winston Peters being in the spotlight as Deputy Prime Minister, and while the party spearheaded the Provincial Growth Fund, the party became better known for stopping progressive policy achievements – such as the capital gains tax – than offering anything new. This fit the party’s anti-establishment brand. However, while the party’s supporter base was more ideologically homogenous than the public as a whole, they were still less homogeneous than the supporters of four of the other five parties examined. Thus, New Zealand First once again found it impossible to satisfy its traditionally ideological diverse supporter base while in government.

However, hidden in the Vote Compass data were multiple public sentiments that align with New Zealand First’s economic nationalistic and protectionist ethos:
- 88 percent thought the Government should impose a royalty on companies that export New Zealand water.
- 82 percent agreed that New Zealand should deport foreigners who are convicted of a criminal offence.
- 71 percent believed the Government should prevent foreign ownership of residential properties.
- 68 percent thought New Zealand should be less reliant on other countries for its goods and services.

To attract this market, New Zealand need to define it, design a product that responds to its’ needs and wants, stay focused on serving it, while maintaining a distinctive position in relation to other parties.
Recommendations for New Zealand First's Future Practice

Respond to a new audience with protectionist-oriented views

1. Conduct market research to better understand voters’ economic concerns, uncertainty about the future, and increasingly protectionist views.
2. Conduct qualitative market research, especially co-creation research, to identify potential solutions to these concerns.
3. Adopt differentiated positioning on issues such as the environment and housing to target a newer generation of more socially conservative, economically nationalistic, and potentially less well-educated working-class voters that no party currently in Parliament is catering to.
4. Adapt the party’s overall image from one focused on stopping ‘the establishment’ to one focused on getting stuff done for their (hopefully) new younger ‘forgotten’ support base.
OVERALL LESSONS FOR PRACTICE

Lessons for New Zealand

Key lessons from research into the 2020 New Zealand General Election included:
1. Political market research remains useful, even when an incumbent politician and party is very popular, to track trends as well as keep an eye out for environmental changes and new opportunities.
2. Aligning policies with public opinion remains important, but the likability of the party leader and the overall party brand is also crucial.
3. The value of political brands can be changed drastically, both negatively and positively, in just three years. This is even more true during a crisis.

13 Global Lessons for Political Marketing and Management during a Crisis

Market research
1. A crisis changes the political market, its’ demands and views, and makes it more volatile.
2. Parties need to continually refresh their market research to understand (a) voters’ evolving priorities (b) identify new opportunities, and (c) monitor the public’s perception of the crisis and government’s management of it.

Strategy
1. Parties and politicians need to adapt strategically to the changing environment and corresponding market research data.
2. Crisis affects strategy by putting the focus on the government rather than the opposition.
3. Governments can utilise crisis management communication to defend their market share.

Branding
1. A crisis can alter whether an existing brand is seen as strong or weak
2. Effective crisis management improves a governing brand.
3. International political brand equity becomes important in a global crisis as voters compare their government’s handling of the crisis against those in other countries.

Communication
1. Leaders need to convey empathy about the effects of the crisis on voters.
2. Crisis-focused government communication can be mixed with campaign communication for electoral purposes.
3. It is hard for the opposition to communicate, as crisis makes it hard for the opposition to get interest in their new products.

Delivery
1. A crisis takes attention away from failed delivery.
2. Opposition attacks on an effective incumbent only damage voters’ perception of the opposition’s responsiveness and governing competence.
Appendix 1: Book Contents


1. Political Marketing and Management in a Global Crisis: Challenges and Continuity in New Zealand 2017-2020 by Jennifer Lees-Marschment
   This chapter provides an overview of political marketing and management in New Zealand. It reviews the election results and identifies key aspects and events that led to them. These include how the Government managed policy, the Christchurch shootings, the COVID-19 pandemic, the relatively late changes in the National Party’s leadership as well as the challenges and opportunities these brought for political marketing and management in practice. It provides an analysis of market-orientation in relation to Labour, National, New Zealand First, The Greens, ACT and the Māori Party. It draws on analysis of party policies, adverts and uses Vote Compass data related to political marketing from the main and post-election surveys.

2. What the Market Wanted: Vote Compass 2020 and Public Views on Policy and Leadership by Edward Elder, Jennifer Lees-Marschment, Lisa Chant, Danny Osborne, Justin Savoie and Clifton van der Linden
   This chapter presents detailed analysis of descriptive statistics from the 182,399 unique respondents who engaged with the Vote Compass engagement tool during the 2020 election campaign. In doing so, it provides a better understanding of what issues the New Zealand public were concerned about and what they wanted a government to do about them. It also outlines how well Labour, National, New Zealand First, The Greens, ACT and the Māori Party’s policy positions aligned with them and how this, along with other factors, contributed to each party’s electoral results. It also provides detail about the public views on the likability of each party’s leader(s) along with lessons moving forward.

3. The COVID-19 Election: How Labour Turned a Crisis into its Biggest Branding Opportunity by Ziena Jalil
   This chapter looks at the political management and marketing demonstrated by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and the Labour Party in the lead-up to the 2020 New Zealand General Election. In particular, the chapter examines how Ardern and Labour were able to utilise management, branding and leadership to strategically capitalise on the change in New Zealand’s political landscape that was a result of COVID-19. Overall, the chapter highlights how Ardern and Labour were able to establish an effective brand that was reassuring, aspirational and symbolised positive values that resonated with the majority of the country, while negating their failure to deliver in other areas.

4. Trashing the Brand: How Brand Damage Dented National’s Chance at the 2020 Election by Heather du Plessis-Allan
   The National Party were, until 2017, the party of government. They enjoyed a well-established brand for economic competence and delivery. This chapter explores how National were able to trash that brand in opposition, particularly once COVID-19 struck. It outlines how the COVID-19
pandemic exacerbated the problems with National’s brand, but that these problems were also self-inflicted thanks to internal disunity and multiple changes in leadership. It shows how National’s behaviour, policies, promises, statements and advertising in the lead up to and during the campaign failed to meet key branding criteria, most notably with regards to credibility and internal values.

5. Targeting Party Supporters, Demographic Segments and Undecided Voters by Edward Elder, Jennifer Lees-Marchment, Lisa Chant, Danny Osborne, Justin Savoie and Clifton van der Linden

This chapter presents detailed analysis of descriptive statistics from the 182,399 unique respondents who engaged with the Vote Compass engagement tool during the 2020 election campaign. In doing so, it outlines how well Labour, National, New Zealand First, The Greens, ACT and the Māori Party’s policy positions aligned with the views of their own supporters, undecided voters as well as key demographics. In doing so, the chapter highlights the importance of key issues and propositions to, as well as other influences on, the electoral success of a political party. The chapter also highlights what this means for the parties and the lessons they need to take from this as they move forward.


This chapter draws on analysis of Labour and Ardern’s communication, an interview with Ardern’s first chief of staff, public polling data, vote compass survey data related to COVID-19 management and post-election survey data on delivery to better understand why Labour struggled to deliver the transformation change they had promised in 2017. In doing so, this chapter conveys how effective crisis management and Ardern’s polite populist strategy masked failures in delivery that was compounded by ineffective delivery marketing during a majority of their first two and a half years back in government. In doing so, the chapter argues that Labour were able to boost public perceptions of their delivery capability, but that this is a short-term solution to a long-term problem.

7. Communicating Market-Oriented Leadership During the COVID-19 Pandemic by Edward Elder and Julia Buder

This chapter examines how the two major party leaders, Jacinda Ardern and Judith Collins, communicated the qualities of responsiveness, leadership and credibility in the leadup to the 2020 New Zealand General Election through both verbal and non-verbal cues. In particular, the chapter focuses on this communication in relation to the issue that dominated the 2020 New Zealand General Election, COVID-19. In doing so, the chapter highlights how Ardern was able to utilise campaign-oriented government communication, her established image as a compassionate governing leader and the success of the Government’s mitigation strategy to present a well-rounded leadership image. It also highlights how Collins, partly due to being new in the role as well as some unforced errors in strategy, was unable to capitalise on being the challenger in order to present herself as a credible and compassionate alternative.

8. Targeted Communication by Major and Minor Parties by Edward Elder, Jennifer Lees-Marchment, Salma Usman Malik and Luna Zhao

This chapter utilises two new targeting models to better understand the strategic effectiveness of two younger candidates from the Green Party and ACT New Zealand in their efforts to targeted
younger voters as well as how effectively National and Labour targeted Chinese New Zealanders in the leadup to the 2020 New Zealand General Election. In doing so, this chapter highlights the importance of these demographics moving forward, yet how political parties and candidates in New Zealand are still coming to terms with the need to directly target particular groups of voters in unique ways in order to be effective in winning them over. In particular, the chapter argues the need to cater communication to the audiences in question over the long-term rather than simply translate broader messages during the campaign period.

9. Practitioner Perspectives on political marketing and management by Jennifer Lees-Marschment, Edward Elder, Robin Campbell, David Farrar, Neale Jones, Tom James, Mike Munro, Shai Navot, David Seymour and David Talbot.
This chapter presents multiple perspectives of practitioners involved from government and opposition, major and minor parties and outside Parliament on the 2020 New Zealand General Election and the years leading up to it. In doing so, they discuss political market research during a pandemic, the successful rebranding and positioning of a minor party, the challenges of marketing a small minor party as well as the political management of policy through government and delivery marketing, the overarching themes of which are discussed at the end of the chapter.

10. Conclusion and Lessons for Future Practice by Edward Elder and Jennifer Lees-Marschment
This chapter draws together the lessons from the research of this book for New Zealand as well as global political marketing study and practice. It summarises and synthesises the findings, explores political market research and what voters wanted, strategy, targeting, party and leadership branding, delivery, leadership campaign communication as well as election branding. It also provides research-led advice for New Zealand political parties and practitioners, as well as lessons for international research on political marketing and management during a crisis-dominated election as well as make suggestions for future research.

Appendix - New Zealand 2020 Vote Compass Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No#</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Issue Topic</th>
<th>Most Common Position</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q41</td>
<td>The government should impose a royalty on companies that export New Zealand water.</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>88.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q83</td>
<td>New Zealand should deport foreigners who are convicted of a criminal offence.</td>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>81.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q106</td>
<td>Patients with terminal illnesses should be allowed to end their own lives with medical assistance.</td>
<td>Conscience Issues</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>74.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q71</td>
<td>The government should prevent foreign ownership of residential properties.</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>71.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q69</td>
<td>The government should cover the cost of dental care for adults with low incomes.</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>69.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q91</td>
<td>How much money should the government invest in the development of railways?</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>68.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q54</td>
<td>New Zealand should be less reliant on other countries for its goods and services.</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>67.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q67</td>
<td>How much should the government spend on rehabilitation services to address drug abuse?</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>About the same as now</td>
<td>67.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q97</td>
<td>How difficult should it be to purchase a gun in New Zealand?</td>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>64.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q134</td>
<td>How much tax should corporations pay?</td>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>61.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q114</td>
<td>How much should wealthier people pay in taxes?</td>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>60.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q40</td>
<td>How much should New Zealand do to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions?</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>59.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q101</td>
<td>Violent offenders under 18 years old should be sentenced as adults.</td>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>58.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q109</td>
<td>Statues of historical figures deemed as racist should be removed from public spaces.</td>
<td>Diversity &amp; Inclusion</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>53.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q30</td>
<td>How high should the minimum wage be?</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>51.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q27</td>
<td>The government should provide free lunches to students in state schools.</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>50.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23</td>
<td>International students should be allowed to enter New Zealand immediately.</td>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>49.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q105</td>
<td>Cannabis should be legalised.</td>
<td>Conscience Issues</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>48.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q32</td>
<td>How difficult should it be for businesses to dismiss new employees?</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>About the same as now</td>
<td>47.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q60</td>
<td>People should be allowed to change the sex listed on their birth certificate, without having to undergo a medical treatment to change their gender.</td>
<td>Diversity &amp; Inclusion</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>47.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q12</td>
<td>The government should guarantee a minimum income for all New Zealanders regardless of whether or not they have a job.</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>46.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q108</td>
<td>Abortion up to twenty weeks should not require medical approval.</td>
<td>Conscience Issues</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>45.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7</td>
<td>How much debt should the government incur to address the COVID-19 crisis?</td>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>About the same as now</td>
<td>44.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q81</td>
<td>How many immigrants should New Zealand admit?</td>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>About the same as now</td>
<td>41.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q125</td>
<td>How difficult should it be to access welfare in New Zealand?</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>About the same as now</td>
<td>40.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24</td>
<td>The government should restore funding for charter schools.</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>37.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q77</td>
<td>The government should ease restrictions on property developers.</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>37.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q43</td>
<td>How much should the government limit oil and gas exploration in New Zealand?</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>36.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q104</td>
<td>How much of a role should the Treaty of Waitangi have in New Zealand law?</td>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>About the same as now</td>
<td>35.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q127</td>
<td>How much should the government do to make amends for injustices committed against Māori?</td>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>35.32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vote Compass New Zealand 2020 Election
Sample Size: 182,399
Appendix 3: Party Leaders Perceived Likeability Among Vote Compass Respondents in 2020
Appendix 4: Perceptions of Labour and National’s Leaders’ Connection with Ordinary People’s Concerns

Labour 2020

National 2020
Appendix 5: Perceptions of Ardern and Collins’ Visions for New Zealand

Jacinda Ardern 2020 – Positive/Negative

Jacinda Ardern 2020 – Clear/Unclear
In your opinion, to what degree did each of the following party leaders convey a positive or negative vision for New Zealand? – Judith Collins
Overall, n = 23,193

-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5

Overall New Zealand

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In your opinion, to what degree did each of the following party leaders convey a clear vision for New Zealand? – Judith Collins

Overall, n = 23,223

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Appendix 6: Labour and National’s Policy Responsiveness to what New Zealanders Wanted

Labour

National
Appendix 7: Perceptions of Labour and National’s Promise Believability in 2020

Labour

National
Appendix 8: Perceived Governing Competence of Labour and National in 2017 and 2020

Labour’s Perceived Ability to Govern in 2017

Labour’s Perceived Ability to Govern in 2020
**Labour seemed to be a united team capable of governing.**

Overall, n = 25,607

Overall New Zealand

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>50</td>
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**National’s Perceived Ability to Govern in 2017**

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. National seemed to be a united team capable of governing.

New Zealand overall; n = 24,512

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<th>Neutral</th>
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<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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<td>10</td>
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**National’s Perceived Ability to Govern in 2020**
National seemed to be a united team capable of governing.
Overall, n = 25,618

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<th>Agreement Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat agree</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>2%</td>
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HELP CREATE AN INFORMED FUTURE

We engage with people and organisations focused on the long-term development of New Zealand, and on core issues where trustworthy and robust analysis can make a real difference.

Professor Sir Peter Gluckman
Director, Koi Tū: The Centre for Informed Futures
Phone: +64 21 775 568
Email: pd.gluckman@auckland.ac.nz

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